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1. What agents? Agents of what? 
One of the several dictionary definitions of "agent" satisfies present 
purposes: "One who exerts power or produces an effect". In discourse 
on development policy up to the present, different theorists and 
ideologists have looked to two main kinds of agents: a) collective 
agents, that is, a class or sub-class destined to bring about social 
and economic transformation through pursuit of its own interests; b) a 
professional elite possessing a correct theory and technical training, 
capable of planning transformation in line with some broad conceptio of 
the national interest. Practically all interpretations of development 
look to both kinds of agents, but with wide variations in their 
emphasis on processes subject to their own laws, and on the feasibility 
or desirability of intervention by political movements or the state 
under the guidance of professional agents. Obviously, moreover, 
different ideologies look to quite different collective and profes-
sional agents, from the industrial entrepreneur to the proletariat and 
from the professional planner to the professional revolutionary. 
As the first two items on the agenda of this colloquium suggest, 
discourse on development has entered a conjuncture of perplexity and 
disillusionment. "Development" of a sort has taken place, according to 
conventional statistical indicators, but seems to have reached an 
impasse. Neither the collective agents nor the professional agents 
have played consistently the parts assigned to them in the 1950's and 
1960"s. The puny capacity of the latter to influence the course of 
events, the frequently perverse consequences of their efforts to do so, 
and the failure of most even to foresee the character of the multi-
facious crises in which Latin America now finds itself are of par-
ticular concern to this meeting. Meanwhile governments and political 
movements, even if convinced that their countries need bold innovations 
in development policy, are overwhelmed by the tasks of crisis manage-
ment and baffled by the discredit into which all the schools of 
development theory have fallen. One might expect that the radically 
critical movement for "another development" that flourished in the 
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1970's, under the stimulus of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, should 
have gained from this conjuncture. In practice, it has not, largely 
because of inability to identify agents capable of carrying out the 
planned transformation whose importance for human welfare it has 
convincingly demonstrated. Its main present contribution seems to be 
more modest, at the local level of popular organization and self-man-
agement. 
One can find some comfort in the reinvigoration of pluralist 
democracy in the face of the crises, and in a more realistic disposi-
tion among the potential agents to accept that no single category among 
them has the right or capacity to impose infallibel prescriptions for 
"development" on a society. The concluding section of the present 
paper will discuss these trends. 
} 
Let us now look at the many different categories of agents that 
must be taken into account in a realistic consideration of development 
policy formation and then at some of the implications of their diver-
sity. In each case, one must keep in mind at least three levels of 
power and visibility with differing rationales for action: the top 
leaders, spokesmen and theorists; the intermediaries and functionaries; 
and the rank-and-file or mass following. 
2. Categories of agents 
(a) Political leaders, who must form their own judgments on the 
desirability and feasibility of development policies, preside over the 
bargaining and compromises needed to get the policies under way, and 
try to "sell" the policies to their own parties and the wider public. 
The pitfalls in this role of voluntarism, improvisation, and infatua-
tion with personally-chosen simplistic solutions have been demonstrated 
repeatedly in the Latin American experience as elsewhere. At the same 
time, experience has demonstrated that effective national policies 
require personification in a leader, possessing a difficult combination 
of self-confidence and self-restraint, able to infuse confidence that 
the major national problems are soluble, that the deficiencies of 
previous ways of conducting public affairs can be overcome, and that 
all legitimate interests can get a hearing. 
(b) Planners and other public technocrats who advise on and administer 
policies on the basis of claims to specialized expertise. These agents 
are in a peculiarly ambiguous position at present: the prestige of 
their expertise has shrunk, for the reasons summarized above, while 
their numbers have increased and the indispensability of their services 
to the state has been augmented by the complexity of the problems now 
confronted and the need to reverse a trend toward deterioration and 
privatization in the state's performance of social and economic 
functions. 
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(c) Other bureaucrats, who generally try to manage the state machinery 
and the use of public resources with a rationality quite different from 
that of the political leaders or the planner-technocrats. 
(d) Capitalists and entrepreneurs, a category that can be divided into 
industrialists, financiers, merchants, owners of modern farms and 
agribusinesses, and illicit entrepreneurs, mainly in the drug traffic 
—groups frequently overlapping but at the same time with very differ-
ent immediate interests and demands on the state. It can be assumed 
that future development policies worthy of support will try to bring 
these groups under more effective control, will stimulate some of them 
while restricting or eliminating others, will curb their export of 
capital, and will seek to capture a major part of their surplus for 
public needs. The objective of inducing the agents in these groups to 
"play a role in a concerted planning effort" cannot be given up as 
Utopian, but it will bbviously require complex bargaining, in which 
conflict will be more prominent than consensus and in which all parties 
will distrust the motives and tactics of their interlocutors. 
(e) Managers and other private technocrats, a category increasingly 
internationalized through their employment by transnational enter-
prises, similar in training to category (c) and sometimes shifting 
between public and private employment. Agents in this category may be 
somewhat more disposed than the preceding category to negotiate 
policies with their counterparts in the public sector, and this 
introduces a likelihood that bargains may be struck with the public and 
even the political leadership kept in the dark. 
(f) Military officers: a category of agents notoriously prone to 
acting as "terrible simplifiers" of development as well as national 
security policy under the tutelage of political ideologists and econo-
mists. These agents are probably somewhat chastened by the conse-
quences of their recent interventions, but the problem of limiting them 
to legitimate functions and a modest share of public resources will be 
permanent. 
(g) Judges and lawyers: another category of agents with a rationality 
of its own, in a position to check arbitrariness in policy application, 
but also to complicate and delay it. 
(h) Trade union leaders: a category now in a difficult position, torn 
between the demands of their members and the present incapacity of the 
state or the employers to offer them significant gains; with their 
traditional ideologies in disarray; frequently also emerging from 
periods of repression and trying to rebuild unions in a setting of high 
unemployment. 
(i) Leaders of associatons of professionals, small business teen* 
farmers and other "middle class" groups. This category generally 
combines a good deal of reliance on some lines of government action 
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with a persistent suspicion of government intervention as designed to 
favour unduly the wealthy, the poor, or the bureaucracy itself. Some 
of its components have a formidable capacity to block, the application 
of development policies perceived as endangering their interests. 
(j) Owners of mass communication media, editors, journalists, tele-
vision and radio commentators, other publicists. Ideally, this 
category of agents should offer the general public objective infor-
mation on development problems and policies, criticize the policies and 
expose shortcomings in their execution, and maintain a forum for debate 
in which all ideologies and interests can make themselves heard. In 
most of Latin America some at least among the mass media probably 
perform these functions more satisfactorily than do their counterparts 
in other parts of the world. Obviously, no society has come close to 
the ideal, either in contributions by the media to informed democratic 
discussion of development alternatives or in the public's receptivity 
to the contributions that are made. Since the function of independent 
criticism is just as important as the function of information, any 
effort by agents of the state to manipulate the media in the interest 
of current policy must be viewed with suspicion. 
(k) Academics, intellectuals, "enlightened" opinion in general. A 
annd many members of this category shift, in the course of national 
political changes, between the rolce of independent theorist and critic 
of development policies and the role of planner or technocrat, but the 
roles themselves are obviously quite distinct. In recent years the 
numbers of persons with advanced education relevant to development 
policy in universities and independent research institutions has 
increased very considerably. Presumably the experiences of recent 
years have enhanced their capacity to confront the problems with less 
dogmatism and subservience to imported theories than heretofore. 
(1) Leaders and spokesmen of religious movements and organizations. 
This category has assumed great importance in confronting development 
policies with the values of human rights and social justice, and in 
helping the poorest and most powerless strata of society to defend 
their own interests. 
(m) Leaders of student organizations. This category continually waxes 
and wanes in its capacity to mobilize a mass following and in its 
degree of autonomy from the political factions in the national society. 
It can be expected to continue to play several contraditory roles: as a 
source of radical criticism and protest against the development 
policies of the state; as an interest-group defending privileges 
associated with higher education; and as a recruiting ground for 
national political and technocratic leadership. 
(n) Leaders and ideologists rejecting the market-oriented economy and 
the dominant international order, including Marxist and other social-
ists; movements combatting the ecological and cultural disbenefits of 
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the Latin American variants of dependent capitalist develoment; 
advocates of self-management, cooperativism, decentralization and 
community autonomy. Within this very diverse and internally conflict-
ive category there seems to have been a good deal of erosion of faith 
in revolutionary seizure of power as the first step to authentic 
development, and an increased influence of ideologies calling for 
autonomous popular organization, action at the local level, and 
transformation of values and cultures as a requisite for "another 
development". 
(o) Leaders of movements of the rural and urban poor. This leadership 
is generally localized and precarious, vulnerable to repression or 
manipulation by agents of the state, and is frequently dependent on 
stimuli from categories (1), (m) and (n). 
In relation to practically all of these categories of agents 
regional and international linkages are complex and influential in ways 
that can be only superficially suggested here. Academic training 
abroad, the prestige of theories fashionable in the central countries, 
contacts with organized interest-group counterparts, the research and 
advisory activities of international organizations, the imported 
content of the press and television, the transnationalization of 
industry and finance, the increasing scale and diversity of population 
movements between Latin America and the central countries, shape the 
expectations of the various agents and set limits to their thinking. 
Even the localized leadership of the poor may have firmer ties with 
external sources of aid than with domestic allies. Even aside from the 
contradictory messages and definitions of allies and adversaries that 
derive directly from superpower rivalries, the external influences are 
very diverse and often deliberately designed to frustrate each other. 
One need only mention the contradictory character of government 
policies and private counter-policies emanating from the United States. 
One should take care not to exaggerate the dependence of national 
agents on influences from abroad, and significant influences acting in 
the other direction can be identified, but any attempt to define the 
roles of "agents" in development must give serious study to the 
International dimensions. 
3. Problems in the way of coherent policies understood and 
backed by broad coalitions of agents 
A mere listing of the categories of agents that have some influence on 
policy formation —all of them very far from unified internally as to 
ideologies and perceived interests— might well make one despdir of the 
possibility of generalizing about "the role they should play in A 
concerted planning effort". Let us try to summarize the problems 
before seeking a way ahead: 
6 
(a) The relatively long history of governmental efforts to mobilize 
consensus behind ambitious development policies and plans is one aspect 
of the present difficulties. Some of these efforts have led nowhere, 
others have had outcomes quite different from those promised. The 
stronger groups in the societies have good reason to rely on their 
ability to manipulate or sabotage policies, while the weaker groups 
have good reason to distrust appeals to shared sacrifices and patience. 
In fact, both try to extricate themselves from dependence on national 
development: the strong by exporting their capital, the weak by 
exporting their labour power. 
(b) The different categories of agents have quite different rationales 
for action and presuppositions concerning "development", based on some 
combination of habit, ideology and perceived self-interest. Even the 
agents that are most articulate and disposed to broad views of the 
national interest have a weak capacity for introspection and self-crit-
icism regarding the sources of their views. Most of them are also 
over-ready to "demonize" the motives of other agents. 
(c) In categories of agents involving leadership of mass followings 
and complex organizations —including the executive power of the state 
itself— there are generally wide gaps between the rationales of the 
leaders, the intermediaries and the base. The leaders tend to exag-
gerate their capacity to control the ini-prmedi ar1 es and mobilize the 
base. 
(d) Policy formation up to the present has shown a curious juxta-
position of narrow opportunism and improvisation with faith in Utopias 
and infallible prescriptions. Agents concerned with broad policy and 
planning have to some extent deluded themselves by focussing on 
imaginary harmonious societies capable of applying their prescriptions, 
and when unable to ignore the discrepancies between suppositions and 
realities have retreated into ritual activities and facade planning. 
(e) Until the beginning of the 1980's the record of development in 
Latin America was sufficiently ambiguous so that agents identified with 
a wide range of policies could feel reasonably confident that things 
would go their way in the future. Rising levels of production and 
incomes, an enormous expansion of education and to a lesser extent of 
other social services, and a greatly enhanced administrative capacity 
of the state seemed to promise that one way or another the notorious 
inequities could be corrected in the course of continuing economic 
growth. The argument advanced by CEPAL, that Latin America had 
achieved an income level at which it could eliminate extreme poverty by 
diversion of a modest share of increments to the incomes of the 
better-off, seemed plausible. Since then, as was stated above, events 
have shaken the confidence of all the key agents. For one thing, most 
of the planners and intellectual agents —including those most critical 
of prevailing styles of development— seem to have been taken by 
surprise by the character of the crises and the consequences of growth 
stimulated by lavish external credits. For another, the crisis 
demonstrated —most glaringly in the case of Mexico— that even a long 
period of satisfactory growth according to the conventional indicators, 
political stability, and continuity in the main lines of policy can 
leave the majority of the population as badly off as ever, and the 
state and the society worse prepared to cope with adversity than at the 
much lower income levels of forty years ago. To resume sustained 
growth, even if feasibly and necessary, can thus hardly become once 
again an aim sufficiently inspiring to mobilize the key agents unless 
they find reason to hope for a quite different pattern of growth. 
(f) The crises have thus left the governments and the agents in the 
private sector nearly bereft of the development ideologies that served 
at least as a rationalization for their actions, and have concentrated 
their attention on improvisations to stave off economic collapse and 
political upheaval. This means, in the case of the agents in the 
public sector, coping with debt negotiations, stagnant export markets, 
and resistances from all strata of the societies to meeting the costs; 
in the case of the agents in the private sector, it means finding ways 
of defending acquired advantages or a bare subsistence. 
4. The way ahead 
An effort to proceed beyond this bleak sketch of an impasse bristling 
with conflicts and cross-purposes risks falling into simplistic 
exhortations or on-the-one-hand-and-on-the-other evasions. The 
international jokes about expert advice of this kind are too well-known 
to need repetition. A few suppositions can be made explicit at the 
outset: 
(a) No single „ category of agents can be nominated for the honour of 
deus ex machina, and no category need be dismissed as altogether 
irrelevant or obstructive. No category of agents is going to become so 
enlightened as to play consistently a role defined for it by planners 
(not even the planners themselves). 
(b) For the immediate future at least, the major agents and the forces 
they represent can neither trust each other, dictate to each other, nor 
dispense with each other. One can hope, however, that most of them, in 
differing combinations in individual countries, will take part in free 
rational public deliberation and through it reach some degree of mutual 
understanding on viable policies and their own part in such policies. 
The current proposals for national pacts and concerted planning express 
this hope. 
(c) No style of development, in Latin America or elsewhere, is likely 
to achieve ideal coherence. The styles most likely to achieve a 
reasonable degree of viability as well as acceptability in terms of 
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human values and rights will be those in which the state has no 
doctrinal objection to vigorous planned intervention to redress the 
shortcomings of the market or, in Dr. RaGl Prebisch's phrase, to 
"socialization of the surplus", but in which the agents of the state 
also keep in mind their own fallibility and the recalcitrance of 
complex societies to centralized direction. Such styles suppose a 
permanent tension between sober realism and the striving for a new and 
better order. 
These suppositions have a corollary with encouraging as well as 
discouraging aspects: No radically new and convincing prescriptions 
for development are at hand. The present crises may eventually lead 
back to reactionary or radical solutions, applied through renewed 
repression or social revolution. But experience has, for most agents, 
dimmed the appeal of such extreme solutions even more than the appeal 
of "developmentalism". t If this is so, the governments and agents 
representing major social forces have to choose among and try to apply 
more effectively policies that they have been trying to carry out or 
claiming to carry out since the 1950's or earlier. Many such policies 
faded out of public attention during the credit-induced complacency of 
the late 1970's, and formulations of them remain embalmed in the 
resolutions of the sessions of CEPAL and other institutions. They 
carry a burden of disillusionment at unhonoured governmental promises 
and lost opportunities. They also contain a wealth of experience that 
planners and other intellectual ageuls should be studying. Some of 
them were quite successful as long as the distribution of power and the 
ideological preferences of the power-holders permitted them to func-
tion. Others proved hopelessly inapplicable or had results quite 
different from those promised for them, yet represent lines of action 
that the national societies can hardly avoid entering upon once again. 
The saying that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it 
comes to mind. Agents may be quite justified in taking up once again 
many of the lines of development policy pursued in the past, but it 
would be inexcusable for them to do so without a historical awareness 
of the past of these policies. 
In fact, Latin America has made enormous advances in research and 
intellectual discourse on social, economic and political questions in 
recent years. Repression, economic crisis, and disillusionment with 
simplistic prescriptions have stimulated as well as obstructed these 
advances. Studies of the functioning of the political and economic 
systems, of the state technocracies and bureaucracies, of the social 
classes, of the features of urbanization and agrarian transformation, 
of the directions of ecological and demographic change, mean that all 
agents willing to learn are in a better position to understand the 
environment on which they are trying to act than a few years ago. 
CEPAL and ILPES have been among the major contributors to the advances. 
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Such advances, of course, do not justify intellectual hubris. 
They do not lend themselves to incontrovertible theories or tactics for 
manipulation of the societies. The realities to which they address 
themselves continue to change rapidly. They are harder for political 
leaders as well as planners to assimilate than the statistical aggre-
gates and indicators on which most planning has relied. The latter, 
generally based on data of dubious reliability supplemented by statis-
tical ingenuity, encouraged the predisposition to plan for imaginary 
societies more manipulable than the real ones. An important desidera-
tum for the present is to make the advances in information and under-
standing more accesible to the general public as well as the agents in 
leadership and planning positions, and to introduce these advances into 
free rational public deliberation over possible futures, as both a 
stimulus and a corrective. 
The discussion of agents of policy and planning in settings of 
economic depression, shrinking resources available for distribution, 
subjection to the dictates of external creditors and investors, and 
immediate policy alternatives that all seem distasteful, dangerous or 
inaccessible is under strong temptation to evade one issue that has 
presented itself ever more insistently in Latin America since the 
beginning of discourse on development. That is the issue of autonomous 
organized participation as agents by the social classes and groups that 
up to the present have been practically excluded from control over 
their own livelihood and the services that the state has provided, 
supposedly for their welfare. This is one of the most complex desider-
ata of an acceptable style of development, susceptible to many variants 
of distortion, from the traditional populist appeals to the masses to 
the regimented and ritualized participatory machinery of some socialist 
states. 
Authentic participation requires the emergence of informed and 
experienced leaders who can represent the excluded in the national 
political arena and vis-a-vis the agents of the state. It also 
requires continual vigilance by the excluded groups to control the 
leáders who claim to represent them, and struggles to overcome deepley 
rooted patterns of clientelism and paternalism. Unfortunately, it also 
requires resilience and ingenuity by the excluded and their leaders to 
cope with periodic repression of their protests. Experience of such 
struggles in Latin America is extensive and in recent years, academic, 
political and religious allies have helped some of the excluded toward 
a historical understanding of them, on the whole with more flexible 
ideological preconceptions than previously .2/ The recent regional 
2/ The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
through its Participation Programme has collaborated with national 
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trend toward political democratization gives the excluded somewhat more 
latitude than before in advancing their own perceived interests. At 
the same time, since the resources of the state for responding to their 
demands are under rigid constraints (except in the sense of the state's 
disposition to encourage or tolerate popular organization), a high 
degree of self—reliance and inno vati veness may be forced on the 
excluded and their allies. 
Lastly, the furtherance of authentic participation requires that 
even the best-intentioned and most technically competent agents within 
the state machinery restrain their own urges to accumulate power and 
their preocupation with standardized norms. "Conscientization" of the 
poor has long been an aspiration valiantly striven for by some of their 
allies. "Conscientization" of agents of the state is an aspiration 
particularly relevant to the present colloquium, on the supposition 
that recent research into bureaucracy can be enlightening and that such 
agents have a certain degree of autonomy and some capacity for self-
criticism. 


